We present results on the last topic we collaborate with our late friend, Professor Ajoy Kumar Datta (1958Datta ( -2019, who prematurely left us few months ago.
Introduction
We consider the problem of constructing a spanning tree in a self-stabilizing manner. Numerous self-stabilizing spanning tree constructions have been studied until now, e.g., the spanning tree may be arbitrary (see [CYH91] ), depth-first (see [CD94] ), breadth-first (see [CDV09] ), shortest-path [CH09] , or minimum [BPRT16] . Deterministic solutions to these problems have been investigated in either fully identified networks [AKY90] , or rooted networks [CD94] . the construction is done by synchronizing phases). Consequently, the obtained memory requirement only depends on local parameters, i.e., Θ(log(δ p )) bits per process p, where δ p the local degree of p. In other word, the space complexity of this algorithm is intrinsically Θ(1) bits per edge. Moreover, the algorithm does not need the a priori knowledge of any global parameter on the network such as D or n. It is worth noticing that today it is still the best self-stabilizing BFS spanning tree construction in terms of memory requirement.
Contribution. We fill the blanks in the analysis of the memory-efficient self-stabilizing BFS spanning tree construction given in [Joh97] . Precisely, we study a slightly modified (maybe simpler) version of the algorithm. This variant still achieves a memory requirement in Θ(1) bits of memory per edge. We prove its self-stabilization under the distributed unfair daemon, the weakest scheduling assumption. Moreover, we establish a stabilization time in O(D · n 2 ) rounds, where D is the network diameter and n the number of processes.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The computational model is described in Section 2. A detailed description of the algorithm is given in Section 3. Basic properties are proven in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that every execution of our algorithm is fair. Its stabilization time in rounds is analyzed in the Section 6.
Model
The chosen computation model is an extension of Dijkstra's original model for rings to arbitrary graphs [Dij74] . Consider a symmetric connected graph G(V, E), in which V is a set of processes and E is a set of symmetric edges. We use this graph to model a distributed system with n processes, n = |V |. In the graph, the directly connected processes are called neighbors. Each process v maintains a set of neighbors, denoted as N (v). N [v] = N (v) ∪ {u} denotes the set of closed neighbors. A process state is defined by its variable values. A configuration of the system is a set of process states.
The proposed self-stabilizing algorithm consists of a set of rules. Each rule has two parts: the guard and the action. The guard of a rule is a boolean function of the process's own state and the state of its neighbors. the action of a rule is a sequence of updating the value of the process variables. If a rule guard on the process v is verified in the configuration c, we say that v is enabled at c. During a computation step, several enabled processes (at least one) execute a single enabled rule. The algorithm designed ensure that at most one rule is enabled on any process at any configuration. An execution is a sequence of consecutive computations steps (c 1 , c 2 , ... , c n , ... ).
A set of configuration A is closed if any computation step from a configuration of A reaches a configuration of A. A configuration set A2 is an A1-attractor, if A2 is closed and all executions starting from a configuration of A1, has a configuration of A2.
An algorithm self-stabilizes to L if and only if L is an A0-attractor (A0 being the set of configurations).
Round complexity. The round notion is used to measure the time complexity. The first round of a computation e = c 1 , ..., c j , ... is the minimal prefix e 1 = c 1 , ..., c j , such that every enabled process in c 1 either executes a rule or is neutralized during a computation step of e 1 . A process u is neutralized during a computation step if u is disabled in the reached configuration.
Let e be the suffix of e such that e = e 1 e . The second round of e is the first round of e , and so on. The stabilization time is the maximal number of rounds needed by any computation from any configuration to reach a legitimate configuration.
Algorithm Specification
We present an anonymous algorithm that builds a BFS spanning tree. Angluin [Ang80] has shown that no deterministic algorithm can construct a spanning tree in an anonymous (uniform) network. The best that can be proposed is a semi-uniform deterministic algorithm, as ours, in which, all processes except one execute the same code. We call r, the distinguished process, the legal root, which will eventually be the root of the BFS tree. dist(u) denoted the distance of process u to r in the graph.
The algorithm is non-silent: at the end of a tree construction, the legal root initiates a new tree construction. The algorithm builds 0-colored and 1-colored BFS spanning tree alternately. The color is used to distinguish the processes of the tree from those that are not part of the tree: inly the processes in the current tree have the tree color, named : r color.
On of the difficulty to build a BFS tree without using a distance variable is to ensure that the path of each process to r in the tree is minimal. Once the system is stabilized, The trees are built in phases: during the kth phase, all processes at a distance of k from r join the current tree (by choosing a process at a distance k − 1 from r as parent) Once r has detected the end of a phase it initiates the next phase. Another difficulty to not having a "distance" variable is to break cycle. A process u in a cycle that does not have the r color detects a conflict if one of its neighbors has the r color but also a specific status, named P ower. Hence cycles are broken but not branches of the r-tree.
There are two major error handling tasks: one is to break the cycles, the other is to remove the illegal branches. The illegal roots detect their abnormal situation and take an Erroneous status. The children of an Erroneous process become Erroneous illegal root. Finally, the Erroneous detached processes recover (changing their status to Idle).
We have 2 sets of rules : the rules RC1-RC6 designed to ensure the illegal trees destruction, and to break cycles are detailed in subsection 3.2; the rules R1-R7 designed to ensure the tree constructions, presented in subsection 3.3. The following subsection presents the shared variables.
Shared Variables
Each process v maintains the following variables (X.u denotes the value of X inu and X.Y.u denotes the value of X in process Y.u):
• T S.u : The parent pointer pointing to one of its neighbors or containing ⊥. T S variables maintain the BFS tree structure in a distributed manner. More precisely, when the system is stabilized, if u = r then dist(u) > dist(T S.u).
• P.u : The parent pointer pointing to one of its neighbors or containing ⊥. When the system is stabilized, if P.u =⊥ then P.u = T S.u. The variable P is used to inform P.u that the subtree construction rooted at u is terminated or not -if at end of a phase, u has no child, (i.e., no u's neighbor has chosen u as parent), then the subtree construction rooted at u is done.
• C.u: The color which takes value from the set {0, 1}. Once the system stabilizes, the processes in the current tree have r color = C.r while other processes have the complement of r color.
• S.u : The status which takes value from the set {Idle, W orking, P ower, W eakE, StrongE}. W eakE and StrongE status are used during the error recovering process. Process u has an Erroneous status if it has the W eakE or StrongE status.
Only processes having the P ower status can have new children. Once the system stabilizes, the processes at a distance of k − 1 from r only will acquire the Power status during the kth phase; if the current phase is begun in u subtree and not yet terminated, then u has the W orking status. u has the Idle status, if the tree construction has not reached it (i.e. P.v =⊥), or the current phase has not started or is finished in u' subtree. r can only have the status P ower or W orking. ph.u : The phase which takes value from the set {a, b}. The value of S does not indicate if the current phase is terminated or not. A process in the tree is Idle when it has completed or has not started the current phase. In order to distinguish between these two cases, we use the phase variable. If the phase value of an Idle process is the same as that of its parent, then the Idle process has finished the current phase. Otherwise, it has not initiated the current phase.
The root r maintains the same variables, except P and T S: r does not have a parent. And S.r can only have the value P ower, W orking or StrongE.
The size of P and T S of a process u is log(δ u ) where δ u is the degree of v. The color, status, and phase variables have a constant size (total 5 bits). Thus, the space complexity of the shared variables on u is 2 · log(δ u ) + 5 bits (i.e., O(1) bits per edge). 
Recovering Rules
A distributed system has an unpredictable initial state. Initially, the parent pointers may point to any neighbor or ⊥. Thus, illegal trees (trees whose roots are not r) and cycles (paths without a root) may exist in the initial state.
Definition 1 (Cycle Path) A series of processes u 1 , u 2 , ... u l is a cycle path if P.u i = u i−1 for 1 < i ≤ l and P.u 1 = u l .
Processes in cycle will detect their situation with the help of their neighbors. Once a conflict detected by a process, it becomes an illegal Erroneous root (rule RC4 or RC5), hence its cycle is transformed into an illegal tree. A process having a parent assumes that it is in the legal tree and its color is equal to r color (even if it is inside a cycle). Based on this assumption, it detects a conflict when a P ower neighbor does not have its color (both cannot be inside the legal tree). An example of such a destruction is given in Figure 1 . The illegal roots detect the abnormal situation and take W eakE status by a RC5 move. Their children take the W eakE status and quits their tree by a RC5 move. Finally, the detached (i.e., without a parent and child) Erroneous processes are recovered: they change their status by executing RC2 or RC6. The repetition of detaching and recovering processing will correct all processes inside the illegal trees (see an example in Figure 2 ).
If a process u = r has in its closed neighborhood two processes having the Power status but not the same color then u detects a strong conflict : the both process cannot be in the legal tree. Therefore, u takes the StrongE status (rule RC4). All P ower neighbors of a process having the StrongE status verify the predicate PowerFaulty : they have to change their status (rule RC1, RC3, RC4, or RC5). When the root detects a conflict it takes the StrongE status (rule RC2). The root detects a conflict if one of its neighbors has the P ower status but not the r color or r has not any child. A Faulty process may become an illegal Erroneous root by execution the rule RC5. A process is Faulty if it does not have the right color, the right status, or the right phase according to its parent's state. More specifically, an non-faulty process has not parent or it parent has an Erroneous status. In the other cases, an non-faulty process, u verifies the 6 following properties. (1) u has not an Erroneous status. (2) u has the same color as P.u. (3) u status is Idle if P.u has not the W orking status. (4) u has the same phase value as P.u if they have the same status. (5) u has the same phase as P.u if u has the P ower status. (6) u is childless, and u has the same phase value as P.u if P.u has the P ower status.
The following predicates are used to define the recovering guard rules:
• Child.u = {v ∈ N (u)|P.v = u} children set contains the u's neighbor direct descendent of u in the tree under construction.
The process u has two closed neighbors v and w that do not have the same color but both of them have the Power status. Moreover u has not the StrongE status.
The process u = r has a neighbor v which has not the u color, and v has the P ower status; moreover u has a parent . The root has a neighbor v which does not have r color, and v has the P ower status or the root has not any child.
• Detached(u) ≡ (Child.u = ∅) ∧ ((P.u =⊥) ∨ (u = r)) ∧ (S.u = P ower) u has no parent or it is the root, u has no child and it cannot gain a child.
• IllegalRoot(u) ≡ (u = r) ∧ (P.u =⊥) ∧ ¬Detached(u) u is not the legal root, it has not parent but it has a child or it has the P ower status (so it may get children).
• IllegalLiveRoot(u) ≡ IllegalRoot(u) ∧ (S.u / ∈ Erroneous) u is an illegal root and its does not have an Erroneous status.
• IllegalChild(u) ≡ (u = r) ∧ (P.u =⊥) ∧ (S.P.u ∈ Erroneous) u has an Erroneous parent.
Algorithm 1 Rules for recovering on r.
RC1 : ¬Conflict(r) ∧ PowerFaulty(r) ∧ QuietSubTree(r) → S.r := W orking; RC2 : Detached(r) ∧ StrongEReady(r) → S.r := W orking; RC3 : Conflict(r) → S.r := StrongE;
Algorithm 2 Rules for recovering on u = r. RC4 : StrongConflict(u) → S.u := StrongE; P.u :=⊥;
Tree construction rules
The rules R1 to R7 have been designed to ensure the tree constructions. A R1 move initiates the tree constructions; a R2 move initiates a phase. R4 and R5 moves propagate the phase wave from r to the processes in tree. processes joint the legal tree by a R3 move. R6 and R7 move propagates backward to r the ending of the current phase.
In the beginning of the kth phase, all processes in the tree take W orking status and r's phase value (by a R4 move), except the leaves (processes at a distance of k − 1 from r) which take P ower status (by a R5 move). All processes at a distance of k from r join the tree by choosing a P ower status neighbor as a parent (update their P and T S variables, but they also take the phase value and color of the new parent) by a R3 move. The processes with P ower status will finish the kth phase (change their status to Idle) when the current phase is over in their neighborhood: all their neighbors are in the tree (they have r color) by a R6 or R7 move. The W orking processes will finish the phase when their children have finished the current phase (they are Idle and have the same phase value as them) by a R6 or R7 move. Figure 3 illustrates the computation step done during the 3rd phase of a 0-colored tree construction. A process state is represented by a triplet: its color, its status, its phase, and a arrow to its parent if the process has a parent. The rule R1 initiates a tree construction. r changes its color and initiates the first phase (by taking the P ower status). When the kth phase is over (i.e., all processes inside the legal tree are Idle and have the same phase as r's one), r initiates the k + 1 phase by executing Figure 3: A computation step during the 3rd phase of a 0-colored tree construction R2: r changes its phase value. When the subtree rooted at a process, u is complete (i.e., its Child set is empty), u sets its P variable to ⊥ by executing R7. Thus, when r becomes childless (child.r = ∅), the tree construction is complete. The tree is stored locally in the T S variables. r initiates a new tree construction, by a R1 move. A complete 0-colored tree construction is presented in Figure 4 .
We define some predicates which are used in the algorithm.
• Ok(u) ≡ ¬StrongConflict(u) ∧ ¬Conflict(u) ∧ ¬PowerFaulty(u) ∧ ¬Faulty(u) ∧ ¬IllegalRoot(u) ∧ ¬IllegalChild(u) The rules RC1, RC4, RC5, and RC3 are disabled on u.
•
All children of u have finished the current phase (i.e. they are Idle and have the same phase value as u).
If u has the P ower status, and all its neighbors has its color then u has terminated the current phase.
• EndPhase(u) ≡ (S.u = W orking) ∧ QuietSubTree(u) u has finished the current phase (not its first one so u has not the P ower status).
u has finished a phase and u is childless. The current tree construction is terminated •
u has finished a phase and it still has some children. The tree construction is not over in its subtree.
Detached process that has or may take the Idle status. v has P ower status and does not have the color of u. Therefore, u assumes that v is a leaf of the current legal tree. Thus, u may choose v as parent and take its color. For error-recovering purpose, u verifies the predicate Ok(u).
• NewPhase(u) ≡ (P.u =⊥) ∧ QuietSubTree(u) ∧ (S.u = Idle) ∧ (ph.u = ph.P.u) v's parent has begun a phase, but u has not. More precisely, u is an Idle process, and u's phase differs from its parent phase. Its parent has the W orking status (otherwise Faulty(u) or IllegalChild(u) is verified), Algorithm 3 Rules on r for the tree construction.
→ C.r := (C.r + 1)mod2; S.r := P ower; R2 : Ok(r) ∧ EndIntermediatePhase(r) → r changes its phase value; S.r := W orking;
Algorithm 4 Rules on u = r for the tree construction. Theorem 1 In any configuration, at least one process is enabled.
Proof:
We consider five possible global configurations :
1 If a process u1 = r verifying the predicate StrongConflict(u1), Conflict(u1), Faulty(u1) or PowerFaulty(u1) then u1 is enabled (rule RC4 or RC5).
2 All processes except r verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, and ¬PowerFaulty. r verifies the predicate Conflict or PowerFaulty. If r verifies the predicate Conflict(r) then the rule RC3 is enabled at r. If r verifies the predicates ¬Conflict(r) and PowerFaulty(r) then QuietSubTree(r) is verified as all children of r verify the predicate ¬Faulty. So the rule RC1 is enabled at r. 3 All processes verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, and ¬PowerFaulty.
There is an illegal tree: there is at least a process u = r verifying IllegalRoot(u). 3.1 If the root of an illegal tree does not have an Erroneous status then this process can execute the rule RC5. It verifies the predicate IllegalLiveRoot.
3.2
The roots of an illegal tree have an Erroneous status. All children of an illegal root are enabled (they verify the IllegalChild predicate). 4 All processes verify the predicates ¬StrongConflict, ¬Conflict, ¬Faulty, ¬PowerFaulty, ¬IllegalLiveRoot, and ¬IllegalChild. There is a process having an Erroneous status.
4.1 S.r = StrongE. We have Child(r) = ∅ as no process verifies IllegalChild, and no r neighbor has the P ower status as all processes verify ¬PowerFaulty. So, r may execute the rule RC2. 4.2 Let u4 = r be a node having an Erroneous status. We have (P.u4 =⊥) as u4 is not faulty; Child.u4 = ∅ as there is not illegal tree. If S.u4 = StrongE then no u4 neighbor has the P ower status (as all processes verify ¬PowerFaulty). So, u4 may execute the rule RC6 or the rule R3. 5 No process has an Erroneous status. All processes verify the predicate Ok(u).
5.1
The legal tree has a W orking leaf. This leaf holds the R7 or R1 guard.
5.2
There is an Idle process u2 on the legal tree that does not have the same phase value as its parent's one. This process verifies the R4 or the R5 guard because the predicate QuietSubTree is verified by u2's children as u2's children are non-faulty and no u2's neighbor has an Erronneous status.
5.3
The legal tree has a P ower process u5 having a neighbor v5 which does not have its color. As, there is not conflict, P.v5 = ⊥ and S.v5 = P ower; as there is not illegal tree Child.v5 = ∅. v5 has the Idle or the W orking status as no process has an Erroneous status. v5 verifies the R3 guard.
5.4
The legal tree has a P ower process u5 whose all neighbors have its color. u5 verifies the R1, R2, R6, or R7 guard; because the predicate QuietSubTree is verified by u5's children as u5's children are non-faulty.
5.5
The legal tree does not have a P ower process, neither a W orking leaf. The legal tree has W orking processes (at least the legal root). Beside every branch of the legal tree ends by an Idle leaf. Thus, the legal tree has a W orking process whose all its children are Idle (these children have its phase otherwise see 5.2). This process verifies the R2 or R6 guard. 2
Faultless processes
Lemma 1 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. The predicate ¬Faulty is closed on process u. Faulty(u) is not verified in c2 if u executes a rule during cs.
Proof: Faulty(r) is never verified. In the sequel u = r
If u executes a recovering rule (i.e. the rule RC4, RC5, or RC6) then Faulty(u) is false in c2 because P.u =⊥.
If P.u =⊥ in c2 then Faulty(u) is false. So in the sequel, we name v the process P.u in the configuration c2. If v executes the rule RC4, RC5, or RC3 then Faulty(u) is false in c2 because S.P.u ∈ Erroneous in c2. As P.u = v in c2; in c1 S.v = P ower or u ∈ Child(v). We conclude that v cannot execute RC6 or RC2 during cs. Assume that v = r executes the rule RC1 in cs. QuietSubTree(r) is verified in c1, the only tree construction rule that may execute u during cs is R3. We conclude that S.u = Idle, ph.u = ph.r and C.u = C.r in c2; so in c2 Faulty(u) is false. We establish that If v executes a recovering rule (i.e. the rule RC1, RC2, RC3, RC5, RC4, or RC6) then Faulty(u) is false in c2 .
The last case to study is the one where only tree construction rules are executed by u and v during cs. Assume that P.u = v in c1. So u executes R3 during cs, we conclude that in c1 S.v = P ower and C.v = C.u; so v does not execute any rule during cs. Therefore, Faulty(u) is false in c2.
Let us study the subcase where P.u = v in c1 and v executes a tree construction rule during cs. u cannot execute any tree construction rule during cs, because QuietSubTree(v) is verified in c1 by hypothesis. If v executes a tree construction rule during cs then Faulty(u) is false in c2 in regard of tree construction guards and actions.
Let us study the subcase where P.u = v in c1 and u executes a tree construction rule during cs. v cannot execute any tree construction rule during cs, because QuietSubTree(v) is not verified in c1. If u executes a tree construction rule during cs then Faulty(u) is false in c2 in regard of tree construction guards and actions. We conclude that Faulty(u) is not verified in c2 if u executes a rule during cs.
Assume that u and v do not execute any rule during cs, if Faulty(u) is not verified in c1 then Faulty(u) is not verified in c2.
Therefore the predicate Faulty(u) is closed. 
InLegalTree, unRegular and influential processes
A process u verifies inLegalTree if and only if u is in a branch rooted at r whose all its ascendants and u are not faulty. Moreover S.r should not be StrongE.
A process verifies either the predicate inLegalTree, Detached or unRegular.
Definition 2 (inLegalTree and unRegular processes)
A process u verifies the predicate inLegalTree iff (u = r), and (S.u = StrongE) or (P.u =⊥), inLegalTree is verified by P.u, and ¬Faulty(u) A process u verifies the predicate unRegular iff ¬Detached(u) and ¬inLegalTree(u)
A PowerParent process u has a descendant (maybe itself) that may take the P ower status, by the execution of a series of R4 and R5 moves.
Definition 3 (PowerParent processes) A process u verifies the predicate PowerParent iff
• (P.u =⊥), (S.u = Idle), (S.P.u = W orking) and (ph.u = ph.P.u), or • (P.u =⊥), PowerParent(P.u), (S.u = Idle) and (ph.u = ph.P.u)
Let v be a process belonging to Child(u) with u verifying the predicate PowerParent. The process v verifies the predicate PowerParent or the predicate Faulty.
Definition 4 (influential processes) A process u verifies the predicate influential iff (S.u = P ower) or PowerParent(u)
Any inLegalTree process is influential after the execution of the rule R2 by the root. No inLegalTree process is influential after the execution of the rule RC1 or RC2 by the root. Only r is influential after the execution of the rule R1 by the root.
Lemma 2 Let cs be a computation step from c1 to reach c2 where a process u = r executes a rule. If u is influential in c2 then u executes the rule R5.
Proof: If u executes the rule RC4, RC5, RC6, or R7, in c2, we have P.u =⊥ and S.u = P ower, so u is not influential. If u executes the rule R6 then we have P.u =⊥ in c1. Let us name v, P.u, in c1. We have S.v = W orking and ph.v = ph.u, in c1. On v, only the rule RC4, RC5, or RC3 may be enabled in c1, as Child(v) = ∅ and the predicate QuietSubTree(v) is not verified in c1. In c2, we have S.v = Idle and ph.u = ph.v. So u is not influential in c2 as S.u = Idle in c2.
If u executes the rule R4 then u is not influential in c2 as S.u = W orking.
If u executes the rule R3 then we have P.u =⊥, in c2. Let us name v, P.u in c2. We have S.v = P ower in c1. On v, only the rule RC1, RC4, RC5, or RC3 may be enabled in c1, as the predicate EndFirstPhase(v) is not verified in c1. In c2, we have S.v = Idle and ph.u = ph.v.
Lemma 3 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. If during cs, u = r becomes influential then u did not execute any move during cs.
Proof: Assume that u executes a move during cs and u is influential in c2. According to Lemma 2, u executes the rule R5 during cs. R5 is enabled only on influential process. So u does become influential during cs. 2
Lemma 4 Let u be a process with u = r. Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. In c1, u is not influential but it is in c2. r executes R2 during cs, and InLegalTree(u) is verified in c2.
Proof: Assume that in c1, u 0 is not influential, but it is in c2. So S.u 0 = P ower in c1.
u 0 does not execute a rule during cs (Lemma 3). We conclude that PowerParent(u0) is not verified in c1 but in c2. As u0 does not execute a rule during cs, we must have S.u 0 = Idle and P.u 0 =⊥ in c1.
Base Case. Assume that P.u 0 = u 1 in c1 with u 1 = r. Assume that u 1 executes a rule during cs. To have PowerParent(u 0 ), we must have S.u 1 ∈ {W orking, Idle} in c2. As Child(u 1 ) = ∅ in c1, u 1 would execute the rule R4 or R6. If u 1 had executed R6 then in c1 we would have Ok(u 1 ), S.u 1 ∈ {W orking, P ower} and ph.u 1 = ph.P.u 1 . Let us name u 2 process P.u 1 in c1. During cs, u 2 may only execute the rule RC1, RC2, RC4, or RC5. In c2, we would have P.u 1 = u 2 , ph.u 1 = ph.u 2 and S.u 2 = Idle; so PowerParent(u 1 ) would not be verified in c2. If u 1 had executed R4 then PowerParent(u 1 ), and PowerParent(u 0 ) would be verified in c1: a contradiction with the hypothesis. We conclude that u 1 does not execute a rule during cs.
We have S.u 1 = Idle and ph.u 1 = ph.u 0 in c1 otherwise u 0 is influential in c1 or u 0 is not influential in c2. Notice that PowerParent(u 1 ) has to be verified in c2 to ensure that PowerParent(u 0 ) is verified in c2; but PowerParent(u 1 ) is not verified in c1 as PowerParent(u 0 ) is not verified in c1.
By induction, we establish that a finite series of processes u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l verifying the following properties exists: PowerParent(u i ) is not verified, P.u i = u i+1 , S.u i = Idle, and ph.u i = ph.u i+1 for 0 ≤ i < l in c1. We have either P.u l =⊥, u l = u i with i < l, or u l = r in c1.
First case, we have P.u l =⊥ or u l = u i with i < l. According to the base case paragraph, processes u i with 0 ≤ i ≤ l do not execute any action during cs. We conclude that u 0 is not influential in c2.
Last case u l = r. During cs, processes u i with 0 ≤ i < l do not execute any action (see base case paragraph). So inLegalTree
Corollary 1 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. If during cs, v becomes influential then C.v = C.r in c2.
UnSafe processes
A unSafe process u verifies the predicate inLegalTree, u may have influential descendants, and u may execute RC4 or RC5. After this move, its descendants have become unRegular.
Definition 5 (insideLegalTree and unSafe processes)
A process u verified the predicate insideLegalTree(u) iff inLegalTree(u), (S.u = P ower), and (Child.u = ∅). A process u verified the predicate unSafe iff insideLegalTree(u) and (∃v ∈ N (u) | C.v = C.u and v is influential).
The current execution may reach a configuration where an unSafe process u may verified the guard of the rule RC4 or RC5, and the predicate insideLegalTree(u).
Lemma 5 ¬unSafe(u) is a closed predicate.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step from c1 to c2. If r executes the rule R1 or RC3 during cs then no process verifies the predicate unSafe in c2 as no process verifies the Predicate insideLegalTree.
In the sequel, we assume that r does not execute the rule R1 or RC3 during cs (i.e. r does not change its color).
Becoming influential. Any process becoming influential during the step cs as the r's color in c1, and in c2 named r color (Corollary 1).
Becoming insideLegalTree. Assume that in c1, insideLegalTree(u) is not verified but it is verified in c2. We conclude that u has executed the rule R2 or R6 during cs; so in c1, u verifies the predicates inLegalTree(u) and EndFirstPhase(u). Therefore in c1, u and all u neighbors have the same color as r, r color. A neighbor of u, v = r, would have not the color r color in c2 if v has executed the rule R3 during cs. In c1, v would verify the predicate Connection(v, w) but also the predicate StrongConflict(v). We conclude that during cs, v could not execute the rule R3; so any neighbor of u, v, verifies (C.v = r color = C.u) in c2. So ¬unSafe(u) is verified in c2.
Becoming unsafe. Assume that in c1, unSafe(u) is not verified but it is verified in c2.
The paragraph "becoming insideLegalTree" establishes that InsideLegalTree(u) has to be verified in c1 to have unSafe(u) in c2. Let v be a neighbor of u that is influential in c2 and C.v = C.u, in c2. Such a process exists because unSafe(u) is verified in c2. We have v = r as InsideLegalTree(u) is verified in c2. The paragraph "becoming influential" establishes that if the process v becomes influential during cs then C.v = C.u = r color at c2. So, v is influential in c1. Hence, v cannot execute R3 during cs, so it cannot change its color. Either C.v = C.u in c1 and unSafe(u) is verified in c1 or C.v = C.u in c2 and unSafe(u) is not verified in c2.
We conclude that no process becomes unSafe during cs. 2
Corollary 2 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2. Let u be a process that is not unRegular and influential in c1 but it is in c2. We have C.u = C.r in c2.
Proof: Let u be a process that becomes unRegular and influential during cs. Lemma 4 establishes that if a process u becomes influential during cs then u is not unRegular in c2. So u is influential and inLegalTree in c1. Therefore in c1, we have C.r = C.u = r color. R1 is not enabled at c1 because inLegalTree(u) is verified. so r has the same color r color in c1 and in c2. In c1, R3 is not enabled on u because it is influential; so u has the same color, r color, in c1 and c2. 2
Lemma 6 Let cs be a computation step from c1 reaching c2 where no unSafe process executes RC4, RC5, or RC3. All unRegular and influential processes in c2 were also unRegular and influential processes in c1.
Proof: Assume that u 0 becomes unRegular and Influential during cs.
If r is unRegular then r is not influential as S.r = StrongE. So u 0 is not r. Lemma 4 establishes that if a process u 0 = r becomes influential during cs then u 0 is not unRegular in c2. So u 0 = r is influential and inLegalTree in c1. Therefore P.u 0 =⊥, and ¬Faulty(u 0 ) in c1. According to Lemma 1, we have ¬Faulty(u 0 ) in c2. We name u 1 = P.u 0 in c1. In c1, we have S.u 1 = P ower as ¬Faulty(u 0 ) and influential(u 0 ) are verified.
By induction, we will build an infinite series of distinct processes u 1 , u 2 , · · · verifying u i = r, P.u i = u i+1 , insideLegalTree(u i ) for i > 1 in c1. As the number of processes is finite : we will establish a contradiction.
Either u 0 executes no rule during cs or u 0 executes the rule R5 (according to Lemma 2). So P.u 0 = u 1 in c2. We conclude that inLegalTree(u 1 ) is true in c1 but not in c2. In c1, insideLegalTree(u 1 ) is true (we have S.u 1 = P ower and Child(u 1 ) = ∅). By hypothesis, u 1 does not execute the rule RC4, RC5 or RC3 during cs.
If u 1 = r then r would execute the rule RC3 during cs because inLegalTree(u 1 ) is true in c1 but not in c2. We conclude that u 1 = r. By definition of insideLegalTree(u 1 ), we have P.u 1 =⊥ (as u 1 = r) and ¬Faulty(u 1 ) in c1. Let us name u 2 = P.u 1 in c1. In c1, we have S.u 2 = P ower as ¬Faulty(u 1 ) and Child(u 1 ) = ∅ are verified. We also have inLegalTree(u 2 ) as inLegalTree(u 1 ) is verified. By hypothesis, u 1 does not execute the rule RC4, or RC5 during cs. The rule R3 or R7 are disabled at u 1 in c 1 . So P.u 1 = u 2 in c2. We conclude that inLegalTree(u 2 ) is true in c1 but not in c2. In c1, insideLegalTree(u 2 ) is true (we have S.u 2 = P ower and Child(u 2 ) = ∅).
By induction, we build an infinite series of processes Lemma 7 Any execution has an inside-safe suffix. The predicate (¬influential ∨ inLegalTree) is closed along an inside-safe suffix.
Proof: Let e be an execution. The predicate ¬Faulty(u) is closed (Lemma 1). So along e the number of processes verifying the predicate Faulty can only decrease. We conclude that e has a suffix where this number does not change.
The rules RC6, RC1 and RC2 are disabled on insideLegalTree processes.
A process verifying the predicate insideLegalTree cannot verified the predicates PowerFaulty, IllegalLiveRoot and IllegalChild. Hence, an insideLegalTree process u executes the rule RC4, RC5 or RC3 at c1 only if u verifies StrongConflict or Conflict at c1 (i.e. u is unSafe at c1).
In the reached configuration c2, after a RC4, RC5 or RC3 move by u we have P.u =⊥ and S.u ∈ Erroneous; so u is not unsafe in c2. The predicate ¬Unsafe is closed (Lemma 5). We conclude that any process u executes at most one time the rule RC4, RC5 or RC3 at a configuration where insideLegalTree(u) is verified. So e has a inside-safe suffix, named e . Lemma 6 establishes that the predicate (¬influential ∨ inLegalTree) is closed during any inside-safe execution. 2
The negation of the predicate (¬influential(u) ∨ inLegalTree(u)) is the predicate (influential(u) ∧ unRegular(u)). A process is silent during an execution if it does not execute any rule during this execution.
Lemma 8 Let e1 be an inside-safe execution e1 has a suffix where influential and unRegular processes are silent.
Proof: An influential process is not influential after any move except R5 (Lemma 2). According the R5 guard and action, the executed rule after a R5 move by a process cannot be R5. So during e1, a process staying forever influential and unRegular executes at most a single rule (R5). 2
Lemma 9 Let e2 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular processes are silent. e2 has a suffix where no process executes RC4 and RC3.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step of e from c1 to c2.
Let u be a process executing RC4 during cs. In c1, two processes of N[u], v1 and v2, have the P ower status and do not have the same color. So one of them, denoted in the sequel v, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c1. According to the definition of e2, v keeps forever it status, so u is disabled along e from c2. We conclude that e contains at most n steps where a process executes RC4.
Assume that r executes RC3 during cs. first case. in c1, r has a neighbor v1 having the Power status but not the r's color. second case. in c1, r has a neighbor v2 having the Power status and Child.r = ∅ (i.e. no process except r verifies the predicate inLegalTree). So v1 or v2, named v in the sequel, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c1.
According to the definition of e2, v keeps forever its status, so r is disabled along e from c2. We conclude that e contains at most one step where r executes RC3. 2
Corollary 3 Let e3 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular processes are silent, and no process executes RC4 and RC3. e3 has suffix where the predicates ¬PowerFaulty and S.r = StrongE are closed.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step of e3 from c1 to c2.
Assume that S.r = StrongE in c2. During e3, no process takes the status StrongE. So in c1, we have S.r = StrongE. The predicate S.r = StrongE is closed along e3.
Assume that PowerFaulty(u) is verified in c2. During e3, no process takes the status StrongE. So, u has a neighbor, v, having the StrongE status in c1. u cannot execute the rule R1 or R5 to take the P ower status during cs according to the rule guards. We conclude that in c1, S.u = P ower: PowerFaulty(u) is verifies in c1. 2
Lemma 10 Let e3 be the inside-safe execution suffix where influential and unRegular processes are silent, no process executes RC4 and RC3, and the predicates ¬PowerFaulty and S.r = StrongE are closed. e3 has suffix where r does not execute the rule RC1 and RC2.
Proof: Let cs be a step of e3 from c1 to reach c2 where r executes a rule. If r executes RC1 or RC2 then the predicate PowerFaulty(r) or the predicate S.r = StrongE is verified in c1. In the sequel, we will prove that these both predicates are no verified after any r move.
If r executes the rule RC1, R2, or RC2 then in c2, we have S.r = W orking. So, ¬PowerFaulty(r) and S.r = StrongE are verified in c2; these both predicates stay verified along the execution e3 from c2 (Corollary 3). So RC1 and RC2 are not executed along e3 from c2.
If r executes the rule R1 then in c1, ¬PowerFaulty(r) and S.r = StrongE are verified. These both predicates stay verified along the execution e3 from c2 (Corollary 3). So RC1 and RC2 are not executed along e3 from c2. We conclude that r executes at most one time the rule RC1 and the rule RC2 along e3. 2
Safe executions
Definition 7 (safe execution) A safe execution is an execution where insideLegalTree processes execute only the rules R1 to R7, influential and unRegular processes are silent, the predicate ¬PowerFaulty is closed and the rule RC1, RC4, RC3 and RC2 are never executed.
A safe execution is an inside-safe execution.
Corollary 4 Any execution has a safe suffix.
Lemma 11 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5 at a configuration where it verifies Conflict and inLegalTree.
Proof: Assume that a process u = r executes the rule RC5 during the step cs from c1 to c2 along e; moreover, in c1 we have inLegalTree(u). So u has a neighbor v verifying S.v = P ower and C.v = r color (r color being the color of r in c1). According to the definition of a safe-execution, v is silent along e because v verifies the predicates influential and unRegular. After u move, u verifies P.u =⊥. Assume that along e from c2 there is a computation step from c3 to c4 where (C.u = r color) ∨ (P.u =⊥) is verified in c3 but not in c4. During cs, u must have execute the rule R3 to choose as a parent a process having the color r color. In c3, u has a neighbor w verifying C.w = r color and S.w = P ower, u verifies the predicate StrongConflict not the R3 guard (because S.v = P ower and C.v = r color). So u never executes the rule R3 to set its color to r color. We conclude that u verifies forever (C.u = r color) ∨ (P.u =⊥). Assumes that u verifies the predicate Conflict and inLegalTree in the configuration c3 reached along e from c2. We have established that C.u = r color in c3 . So u has a neighbor w verifying C.w = r color and S.w = P ower; we conclude that u does not verify the RC5 guard but the RC4 guard because S.v = P ower and C.v = r color in c 3 .
We conclude that u executes at most one time the rule RC5 at a configuration where it verifies Conflict and inLegalTree along e.
2
Lemma 12 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5 at a configuration where it verifies PowerFaulty or Faulty.
Proof: Let cs be a step of e from c1. Let u be process u that executes the rule RC5 during cs.
Assume that u verifies the predicate Faulty or PowerFaulty in c1. After the step cs, u never verifies the predicate Faulty and the predicate PowerFaulty according to the definition of a safe execution and Lemma 1. So it never executes again RC5 at a configuration where these predicates are verified. 2
Lemma 13 Let e be a safe execution e has a suffix where no process executes the rule RC5 at a configuration where it verifies inLegalTree.
Proof: A process u verifying the predicate inLegalTree does not verify the predicate IllegalRoot and does not verify the predicate IllegalChild. e has a suffix e1 where no process verifying PowerFaulty or Faulty executes RC5 (Lemma 12). e1 has a suffix e2 where RC5 is not executed by processes verifying inLegalTree and Conflict (Lemma 11). We conclude that in e2 no process verifying inLegalTree executes RC5. 2
Lemma 14 Let e1 be a safe execution where no inLegalTree process executes the rule RC5. e1 has a suffix where the predicate ¬unRegular is closed.
Proof: Along e1, a process u becomes unRegular if during the execution of the rule R3: u chooses as parent an unRegular process v having the status P ower. According to the definition of safe-execution, v is silent along e. So, the only enabled rule at u after this move is RC4. We conclude that the process u is silent after its R3 action along e1. As a process may become unRegular at most one time along e1; e1 has a suffix where the predicate ¬unRegular is closed. 2
Definition 8 (pseudo-regular executions) A pseudo regular execution is a safe execution where inLegalTree processes execute only the rules R1 to R7, and the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is closed.
In the section 6, we established that any execution from a configuration of A4 is pseudoregular. A4 is an attractor reached in 16n − 13 rounds.
Lemma 15 Let e2 be a pseudo-regular execution. e2 has a suffix where no process executes rule RC5.
Proof: Let u be a process executing RC5 along e2 from c1 to reach the configuration c2. In c1, unRegular(u) is verified. In c2, S.u ∈ Erroneous and P.u =⊥. The next move of u, if it exists, is the execution of the rule RC6 or R3. Assume that u executes RC6 or R3 at the configuration c3. Detached(u) is verified in c3. So the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is verified along e2 from c3 (by definition of e2). Along e2, a process u executes at most one time the rule RC5.
Let e3 be a a pseudo-regular execution where no process executes the rule RC5. S.u / ∈ Erroneous is closed along e3. So a process executes at most one time the rule RC6 along this execution.
Regular executions
Definition 9 (regular execution) A regular execution is a pseudo-regular execution where processes execute only the rules R1 to R7, and the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is closed.
Corollary 5 Any execution has a regular suffix.
During a regular execution, the move of a process u = r belongs to the language: (R3 R5 (R6R4) * R7) * , and the moves of r belong to the language : (R1 R2 * ) * .
Lemma 16 Let e be a regular execution where a process u never changes its color. The execution e has a suffix where all processes of N(u) do not change their color.
Proof: Assume that u keep the color co along e. A process changes its color by the execution of the rule R3 or the rule R1. Let v be a process of N(u). v never verifies EndFirstPhase(v) if C.v = co along e. So the execution of the rule R3 or R1 by v to take the color C.v = col is the second to last or the last move of v. Therefore, v changes its color at most 2 times along e : one to take the color co, and the last one to take the color co. 2
Corollary 6 Let e be a regular execution where a process u never changes its color. The execution e has a suffix where no process changes its color.
In the sequel of this section, we study regular executions where no process changes its color. We will establish that such executions do not exist.
Observation 2 Let exc be a regular execution where no process change its color. There is no terminal configuration; so at least a process along exc executes infinitely often a rule. The moves of any process u = r belong to the language R5R7 or to the language (R6R4) * R7. The moves of r belong to the language R2 * . Along exc no process joins any Child(u) set.
Lemma 17 Let exc be a regular execution where where no process changes its color. Let u be a process executing infinitely often a rule along exc. u has forever a child that also executes infinitely often a rule.
Proof: The moves of u belong to the language (R6R4)
* if u = r or to R2 * . So u changes its phase value infinitely often (rule R4 or R2). u cannot gain a child. From a configuration where the rule R4 or R2 are enabled at u, Child(u) is not empty and QuietSubTree(u) is verified. So at least a process v verifies forever P.v = u and v changes its phase value infinitely often along exc.
Corollary 7 Let exc be a regular execution where no process changes its color. There a cycle path whose all the processes execute infinitely often a rule.
Theorem 2 Let exc be a regular execution. Along exc every process changes its color infinitely often.
Proof: Let exc be a regular execution. Assume that no process changes its color along exc.
There a cycle path u 1 , u 2 , ... u l whose all the processes execute infinitely often a rule along exc (Corollary 7). As any process u i is not silent along exc; we have S.u i ∈ {W orking, Idle} along exc. In a configuration reached by exc, if S.u i = Idle then S.u i+1 = Idle otherwise Faulty(u i+1 ) would be verified (and u i and u i+1 would be silent). So in any configuration reached by exc, we have S.u i = S.u i+1 with 0 < i < l.
There is a contradiction as no process of the cycle path is enabled at a configuration where
Every execution of the algorithm has a regular suffix. During a regular execution, every process changes its color infinitely often (i.e. they execute R3 or R1 rule infinitely often). At a configuration where R1 or R3 is enabled at u we have ¬unRegular(u).
Convergence Time
Lemma 18 The predicate ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u) is closed.
Proof: There is not creation a new illegal root that does not have an Erroneous status:
• An process that does not have the P ower status cannot gain children.
• An process u = r without parent cannot take the P ower status.
• At time a process sets P to ⊥ it also sets its status to StrongE or W eakE if it has or may gain children. 2
Theorem 3 Let A0 be the set of configurations. A1 ≡ { ∀ u, ¬Faulty(u) ∧ ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u) }. is an A0-attractor reached from A0 in one round.
Proof: ¬Faulty(u) is closed (Lemma 1) and ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u) is closed (Lemma 18). So A1 is closed. As long as a process u satisfies the Faulty or IllegalLiveRoot predicate, u is enabled (it verifies the RC4 or RC5 guard). After RC4 or RC5 action by u, we have ¬Faulty(u) ∧ ¬IllegalLiveRoot(u). So, after the first round, A1 is reached. 2
Erroneous processes
Lemma 19 Let c be a configuration where the process u has an Erroneous status. Let e be a execution from c where u keeps its status more than one round. At the end of the first round of e from c, Detached(u) is verified and this property stays verified till u has an Erroneous status.
Proof: Till S.u ∈ Erroneous, no process chooses u as Parent. Let v be a process of Child(u) in c. We have v = r. The rule RC4 or RC5 is enabled at v till S.u ∈ Erroneous. So v quits Child(u) before the end of the first round from c. We have Child(v) = ∅ at then end of the first round from c. If P.u =⊥ (we have u = r) then RC4 or RC5 is enabled at v. So Detached(u) is verified at the end of the first round from c. To conclude, we notice that the predicate Detached(u)
Lemma 20 Let c be a configuration of A0 where the process S.u = StrongE status. Let e be a execution from c. Before the end of the second round u has changed its status to Idle.
Proof: Assume that u keeps its status during the first round of e.
The predicate Detached(u) is verified at then end of the first round from c. The predicate Detached(u) stays verified till S.u = StrongE (Lemma 19).
Till S.u = StrongE, no process in N(u) takes the P ower status. Let v be a process of N(u) verifying S.v = P ower in c. The rule RC1, RC4, RC5, RC3 is enabled at v till S.u = StrongE. So S.v = P ower before the end of the first round from c. At the end of the first round, we have StrongEReady(v); this property stays verified till S.u = StrongE.
During the second round, u is always enabled (R3, RC6, or RC2). So u executes one of this rule that changes it status to Idle. 2
Lemma 21 Let c be a configuration where the process u has the status W eakE. Let e be a execution from c. Before the end of the second round, u has changed its status to Idle or to StrongE.
Proof:
We have u = r. Assume that u keeps its status during the first round of e. The predicate Detached(u) is verified at the end of the first round from c and the predicate Detached(u) stays verified till S.u = W eakE (Lemma 19). Till S.u = W eakE and Detached(u), one of the rule RC4, RC6 or R3 is enabled on u. So before the end of the second round, u has changed its status to Idle or StrongE. 2
Power processes
Lemma 22 Let c be a configuration of A0 where a process u has the P ower status. Let e be an execution from c. Let v be a u neighbor. The predicate C.v = C.u holds along e till u keeps the P ower status.
Proof: On a configuration where S.u = P ower and (C.v = C.u), R1 and R3 are not enabled at v. So till S.u = P ower the predicate (C.v = C.u) is closed. 2
Lemma 23 Let c be a configuration of A0 where the process u has the P ower status. Let e be an execution from c where u keeps its status P ower during at least a round. At the end of the first round of e from c, we have {∀v ∈ N (u) | (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous)}, this property holds along e till u keeps the P ower status.
Proof: Let e be a execution from c where u keeps the status P ower during a round starting at the configuration c. Let v be a process of N (u) verifying (C.v = C.u)∧(S.v / ∈ Erroneous) at c. Till ¬Ok(v) is verified, RC4, RC5, RC3 or RC1 is enabled at v. Till both predicates Ok(v) and (C.v = C.u) ∧ (S.v / ∈ Erroneous) are verified during this round, Connection(v, u) is verified. So, R3 is enabled at v if v = r. v = r cannot verify the predicates Ok(r) and (C.r = C.u) ∧ (S.r / ∈ Erroneous). We conclude that till (C.v = C.u) ∧ (S.v / ∈ Erroneous) is verified, v is enabled (rule R3, RC5, RC4, RC3, or RC1). After the v move, we have (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous).
Let v be a process of N (u) verifying (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous) at a configuration c, where S.u = P ower. Assume that (C.v = C.u) in c, we have (S.v ∈ Erroneous) in c by hypothesis. Only the rule R3, RC4, RC5 may be enabled at v. We have (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous) in reached configuration after a move by v. Till S.u = P ower the predicate (C.v = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22).
Observation 3 Let c be a configuration of A1. Any P ower process u verifies QuietSubTree(u) otherwise u would have a Faulty child. Any process v verifying the predicate NewPhase verifies QuietSubTree(v) otherwise v would have a Faulty child.
Theorem 4 Let c be a configuration of A1 where the process u has an P ower status. Let e be a execution from c. Before the end of the 4th round of e from c, u has changed is status or u has executed the rule R1.
Proof: If u has a neighbor having the status StrongE before or at the end of the third round then PowerFaulty(u) is verified till S.u = P ower. So u changes its status before the end of 4th round. In the sequel, we study the executions e from c where no u neighbor has the status StrongE during the first 3 rounds of e.
Assume that u keeps its status P ower during the first 3 rounds of e from c. At the end of the first round, we have {∀v ∈ N (u) | (C.v = C.u) ∨ (S.v ∈ Erroneous)}, this property holds along e till u keeps the P ower status (Lemma 23). Let v1 be a neighbor of u, verifies C.v1 = C.u in c Till S.u = P ower the predicate (C.v1 = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22).
Let v2 be a neighbor of u having the status W eakE at the end of the first round of e from c. Before the end of the third round, v2 has changed its status to Idle or StrongE (Lemma 21). As no u neighbor has the StrongE status (by hypothesis), before or at the end of the third round from c of e, a configuration c v2 where C.v2 = C.u is reached. Till S.u = P ower the predicate (C.v2 = C.u) is closed (Lemma 22). Therefore, before or at the end of the third round from c of e, a configuration c where {∀v ∈ N (u) we have (C.v = C.u)} is reached. From c , till S.u = P ower, we have QuietSubTree(u) (Observation 3). So, from c till S.u = P ower, u is enabled (RC5, RC4, RC3, R7, R6, R2, or R1). We conclude that u changes its status before the end of 4th round or u has executed the rule R1. 2
Unsafe processes
Definition 10 Let A2 be the set of configurations defines as A2 ≡ A1 ∩ {∀ u ∈ V , ¬Unsafe(u)}.
In the sequel, we establish that in at most 8n − 8 rounds from a configuration of A1, A2 is reached along any execution; and A2 is a A1-attractor.
Definition 11 Let c be a configuration of A1. The predicate PIC(u) on process is defined as PIC(u) ≡ influential(u) ∧ (C.u = C.r). #P IC c = |{u | P IC(u) is verif ied in c. }|.
The predicate PIC PowerParent(u) on process is defined as PIC PowerParent(u) ≡ PIC(u) ∧ PowerParent(u). #P IC P owerP arent c = |{u | P IC P owerP arent(u) is verif ied in c. }|.
Lemma 24 Let c 1 be a configuration of A1. Let cs be a step from c1 to c 2 where r does not change its color. If the predicate PIC(u) (resp. PIC PowerParent(u)) is verified in c 2 then it is verified in c 1 (resp. PIC PowerParent(u)).
Proof:
If in c 1 , S.u = P ower is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c 2 . So, if PIC PowerParent(u) is verified in c 2 then it is verified in c 1 .
So #P IC c 2 ≤ P IC c 1 and #P IR P owerP arent c 2 ≤ P IR P owerP arent c 1 . 2
Lemma 25 Let c 1 be a configuration of A1 where #P IC c 1 > 0. Let e be a execution from c 1 . Let c 4 be the configuration reached after 4 rounds along e. Assume that during the first 4 rounds of e, r does change its color. If #P IC c 4 = #P IC c 1 then #P IC P owerP arent c 4 < #P IC P owerP arent c 1 .
Proof: In the proof, we assume that #P IC c 4 ≥ #P IC c 1 .
Let cs be a computation step from c to reach c belonging to the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 24, if in c , we have PIC(u) then PIC(u) is verified in c and in c 1 . According to the the hypothesis, any process verifying PIC in c 1 , verifies this predicate in any configuration reached during the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 2 (page 14), the only rule that may execute a process u 1 verifying PIC in c 1 during the the first 4 rounds of e is R5. Assume that u 1 executes R5 during cs. In c, PowerParent(u 1 ) is verified but not in c . According to Lemma 24, we have #P IC P owerP arent c 4 < #P IC P owerP arent c 1 .
In the sequel, we study executions e where processes verifying PIC in c 1 are silent during the first 4 rounds.
Assume in c 1 , there is a process u 2 verifying P IC(u 2 ) ∧ S.u 2 = P ower : we have u 2 = r. According to Theorem 4, u 2 executes a rule during the first 4 rounds of e. There is a contraction. We conclude that in c 1 , we have (P IC(u) =⇒ P IC P owerP arent(u)). As, processes verifying PIC in c 1 are silent during the first 4 rounds of e; in any reached configuration we have (P IC(u) =⇒ P IC P owerP arent(u)). So during the first 4 rounds, no process verifies PowerConflict and Conflict(r) is not verified as any process u verifies S.u = P ower ∨ C.u = C.r. Hence, the rule RC3 and RC4 are not executed during the first 4 rounds of e.
Let cs be a computation step from c to c belonging to the first 4 rounds of e. If S.w = StrongE in c then S.w = StrongE in c and in c 1 . Let c 2 be the configuration reached at the end of the 2th round of e from c. According to the Lemma 20 (page 23), in c 2 and during the first round from c 2 along e, every process verifies S.w = StrongE.
A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified as no process is faulty in A1. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in c 2 there is a process u 2 verifying PIC PowerParent(u 2 ) and ph.P.u 2 = ph.u 2 . Let v be P.u 2 in c 2 . Till PowerParent(u 2 ) and ph.P.u 2 = ph.u 2 are verified the rules RC1, RC2, RC6, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 are disabled on v. If v executes the rule RC3, RC4, RC5 then in the reached configuration, we have S.v ∈ Erronneous so PowerParent(u 2 ) is not verified. Hence, according to Lemma 24, we have #P IC P owerP arent c 4 < #P IC P owerP arent c 1 .
So, v does not execute any rule from c 2 along e during first 2 rounds. Therefore, NewPhase(u 2 ) is verified in c 2 and during the 3th round of e from c 1 . Till NewPhase(u 2 ) is verified, u 2 may execute a rule (RC4, RC5, R4, or R5) because every process verifies S.w = StrongE. The process u 2 cannot be silent during the third round of e. We conclude that at least a process verifying PIC in c 1 , does a move during the first 4 rounds. So, we have #P IC P owerP arent c 4 < #P IC P owerP arent c 1 .
Lemma 26 A2 is a A1-attractor reached in at most 8n − 8 rounds from a configuration of A1 (i.e. A2 is a A0-attractor reached in at most 8n − 7 rounds from any configuration).
Proof: For any process u, ¬unSafe(u) is a closed predicate (Lemma 5, page 15).
Let c1 be a configuration of A1. Let e be an execution starting at c1. After the execution of R1, no process is Unsafe as no process verifies insideLegalTree.
In the sequel, we assume that during the first 8n − 8 rounds of e, the rule R1 is not executed. So r does not change its color r color during the first 8n − 8 rounds of e.
In a configuration where no process u verifying PIC(u), no process verifies the predicate unSafe (notice that ¬unSafe is a closed predicate). The predicates ¬PIC and ¬PIC PowerParent are closed along the first 8n − 8 rounds of e (Lemma 24).
convergence part. Let c be a configuration of A1. V alP IC c = #P IC P owerP arent c + #P IC c . We have V alP IC c ≤ 2n − 2 as PIC(r) is not verified. Let cs be a computation step from c to c done during the first 8n − 8 rounds of e. As the predicates ¬PIC and ¬PIC PowerParent are closed along the first 8n − 8 rounds of e (Lemma 24); we have V alP IC c ≥ V alP IC c . Let c4 be the configuration reached the end of first 4 rounds of e from c1. According to Lemma 25, we have V al c4 < V alP IC c1 if V alP IC c1 > 0. Let cf be the configuration reached the end of first 8n − 8 rounds of e from c1. So, we have V alP IC cf = 0 (i.e. no process u verifying PIC(u)). We conclude that no process is unSafe at the end of first 8n − 8 rounds of e from c1. 2
Influential and unRegular processes
Definition 12 Let A3 be the set of configurations defined as A3 ≡ A2 ∩ { ∀ u, ¬Influential(u) ∨ inLegalTree(u)}.
In the sequel, we establish that in at most 8n − 8 rounds from a configuration of A2, A3 is reached along any execution; and A3 is a A2-attractor.
Definition 13 Let c be a configuration of A1. The predicate PIR(u) on process is defined as PIR(u) ≡ influential(u) ∧ unRegular(u). #P IR c = |{u | P IR(u) is verif ied in c. }|.
The predicate PIR PowerParent(u) on process is defined as PIR PowerParent(u) ≡ PIR(u) ∧ PowerParent(u). #P IR P owerP arent c = |{u | P IR P owerP arent(u) is verif ied in c. }|.
Observation 4 The negation of the predicate (¬influential(u) ∨ inLegalTree(u)) is the predicate PIR(u).
Lemma 27 Let c 2 be a configuration of A2. Let cs be a step from c 2 to c 3 . If the predicate PIR(u) (resp. PIR PowerParent(u)) is verified in c 3 then it is verified in c 2 (resp. PIR PowerParent(u)).
Proof: According to lemma 6 (page 16) and A2 definition, if a process u verifies PIR(u) in c 3 is also verifies this predicate in c 2 .
If in c 2 , S.u = P ower is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c 3 . So, if PIR PowerParent(u) is verified in c 3 then it is verified in c 2 .
So #P IR c 3 ≤ P IR c 2 and #P IR P owerP arent c 3 ≤ P IR P owerP arent c 2 . Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 25.
In the proof, we assume that #P IR c 4 = #P IR c 2 .
Let cs be a computation step from c to c belonging to the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 27, if in c , we have PIR(u) then PIR(u) is verified in c and in c 2 . According to the the hypothesis, any process verifying PIR in c 2 , verifies this predicate in any configuration reached during the first 4 rounds of e. According to Lemma 2 (page 14), the only rule that may execute a process u 1 verifying PIR in c 2 during the the first 4 rounds of e is R5. Assume that u 1 executes R5 during cs. In c, PowerParent(u 1 ) is verified but not in c . According to Lemma 27, we have #P IR P owerP arent c 4 < #P IR P owerP arent c 2 .
In the sequel, we study executions e where processes verifying PIR in c 2 are silent during the first 4 rounds.
Assume in c 2 , there is a process u 2 verifying P IR(u 2 ) ∧ S.u 2 = P ower : we have u 2 = r. According to Theorem 4, u 2 executes a rule during the first 4 rounds of e. There is a contraction. We conclude that in c 2 , we have (P IR(u) =⇒ P IR P owerP arent(u)). As, processes verifying PIR in c 2 are silent during the 4 first rounds of e; in any reached configuration we have (P IR(u) =⇒ P IR P owerP arent(u)). So during the first 4 rounds, no process verifies PowerConflict and Conflict(r) is not verified as any process u verifies S.u = P ower ∨ C.u = C.r. Hence, the rule RC3 and RC4 are not executed during the first 4 rounds of e.
Let cs be a computation step from c to c done during the first 4 rounds of e. If S.w = StrongE in c then S.w = StrongE in c and in c 2 . Let c 3 be the configuration reached at the end of the 2th round of e from c. According to the Lemma 20 (page 23), in c 3 and during the first round from c 3 along e, every process verifies S.w = StrongE.
A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified as no process is faulty in A1. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in c 3 there is a process u 2 verifying PIR PowerParent(u 2 ) and ph.P.u 2 = ph.u 2 . Let v be P.u 2 in c 3 . Till PowerParent(u 2 ) and ph.P.u 2 = ph.u 2 are verified the rules RC1, RC2, RC6, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 are disabled on v. If v executes the rule RC3, RC4, RC5 then in the reached configuration, we have S.v ∈ Erronneous so PowerParent(u 2 ) is not verified. Hence, according to Lemma 27, we have #P IR P owerP arent c 4 < #P IR P owerP arent c 2 .
So, v does not execute any rule during first 2 rounds of e from c 3 . Therefore, NewPhase(u 2 ) is verified in c 3 and during the 3th round of e from c 2 . Till NewPhase(u 2 ) is verified, u 2 may execute a rule (RC4, RC5, R4, or R5) because every process verifies S.w = StrongE. The process u 2 cannot be silent during the third round of e. We conclude that at least a process verifying PIR in c 2 , does a move during the first 4 rounds. So, we have #P IR P owerP arent c 4 < #P IR P owerP arent c 2 .
Lemma 29 A3 is a A2-attractor reached in at most 8n − 8 rounds from a configuration of A2. (i.e. A3 is a A0-attractor reached in at most 16n − 15 rounds from any configuration).
Proof: The predicates ¬PIR PowerParent and ¬PIR are closed (Lemma 27).
The sequel of the proof is similar to the convergence part of proof of Lemma 26. Let c2 be a configuration of A2. V alP IR c = #P IR P owerP arent c + #P IR c . We have V alP IR c ≤ 2n − 2 as PIR(r) is not verified. Let cs be a computation step from c reaching c done during the first 8n − 8 rounds of e. As the predicates ¬PIR and ¬PIR PowerParent are closed along e (Lemma 27), we have V alP IR c ≥ V alP IR c . Let c4 be the configuration reached the end of first 4 rounds of e from c2. According to Lemma 28, we have V alP IR c4 < V alP IR c2 if V alP IR c2 > 0. Let cf be the configuration reached the end of first 8n − 8 rounds of e from c2. So, we have V alP IR cf = 0. We conclude that no process verifying PIR(u). 2
Properties of A4
Lemma 30 Let A4 be the set of configurations. A4 ≡ A3 ∩ { ∀ u, (S.u = StrongE) } is an A3-attractor reached from A3 in 2 rounds (i.e. A4 is a A0-attractor reached in at most 16n − 13 rounds from any configuration).
Proof: Let c3 be a configuration of A3. Let u be a process verifying in c3 StrongConflict(u). So two processes of N[u], v1 and v2, has the P ower status and do not have the same color. One of them, denoted v, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c3. It is impossible according to the definition of A3. Therefore the rule RC4 is not enabled at any process in c3.
Assume that in c3, Conflict(r) is verified. first case. in c3, r has a neighbor v3a having the Power status but not the r's color. second case. in c1, r has a neighbor v3b having the Power status and Child.r = ∅ (i.e. no process except r verifies the predicate inLegalTree). So v3a or v3b, named v in the sequel, verifies the predicate (influential(v) ∧ unRegular(v)) in c3. It is impossible according to the definition of A3. Therefore the rule RC3 is not enabled in c3.
We conclude that the property (S.u = StrongE) is closed in A3.
According to Lemma 20 (page 23), after 2 rounds of any execution from c3, a configuration of A4 is reached. 2
Lemma 31 Let c4 be a configuration of A4. In c4, the rule RC5 is disabled at any process verifying the predicate inLegalTree.
Proof: Assume that the rule RC5 is enabled at u a process u verifying inLegalTree(u). In c4 ∈ A4, u cannot verify one of the following predicates : Faulty(u), PowerFaulty(u), IllegalLiveRoot(u), IllegalChild(u). So Conflict(u) is verified in c4. So u has a neighbor v verifying S.v = P ower and C.v = r color (r color being the color of r). We have Influential(v) and ¬inLegalTree(v), in c4. It is impossible according to the definition of A4. 2
Lemma 32 Any execution from a configuration of A4 is a pseudo-regular execution (Definition 8, page 21). In A4, the predicate ¬unRegular(u) is closed Proof: Let c4 be a configuration of A4. In c4, no process is influential and unRegular and no process verifies the predicate P owerF aulty according to the definition of A4. Let cs be a computation step from c4 reaching the configuration c5. In c4, no process verifies on of the both predicates PowerFaulty and StrongEReady. So during cs, r does not executes the rule RC1 or RC2. According to Lemma 30, c5 ∈ A4. So during cs, no process executes the rule RC3 or RC4. According to Lemma 31, the rule RC5 is disabled on processes verifying the predicate inLegalTree. We conclude that during cs, processes verifying the predicate inLegalTree execute only the rules R1 to R7. Hence, any execution from c4 is a safe execution (Definition 7, page 21). During cs, a process u becomes unRegular if it executes the rule R3 to choose as a parent an unRegular process v having the status P ower. We have Influential(v) and ¬inLegalTree(v), in c4. It is impossible according to the definition of A4. We conclude that any execution from c4 is a pseudo-regular execution. 2
Lemma 33 On any configuration of A4, the predicate Ok(r) is verified. Lemma 34 In A4, the predicate ¬unRegular(u) ∧ (inLegalT ree(u) ∨ (S.u = Idle)) is closed.
Proof: Let c4 be a configuration of A4. Let Pre(u) be the predicate unRegular(u) ∨ (¬inLegalT ree(u) ∧ (S.u = Idle)). Let cs be a computation step from c4 reaching the configuration c5. Let u be a process verifying Pre(u) in the configuration c5. We have u = r, as inLegalTree(r) is verified in any configuration of A4. Assume that u does not verify Pre(u) in c4, we have ¬unRegular(u). So in c5, we have ¬unRegular(u) (Lemma 32). First case, inLegalT ree(u) is verified in c4 but not in c5. Hence, u executes R7 during cs: in c5, we have S.u = Idle : Pre(u) is not verified in c5. Second case, ¬inLegalT ree(u) is verified in c4. Detached(u) is verified in c4, as ¬unRegular(u) is verified. By hypothesis S.u = Idle in c4. The only R3 may be enabled on u in c4. Hence, in c5, we have S.u = Idle. Pre(u) is not verified in c5.
We conclude that if in c5, Pre(u) is verified then it is verified in c4. 2
The termination of the current tree construction in A4
Definition 14 The predicate correct(u) is defined as
Any configuration where EndLastPhase(r) is verified belong to A5(l) with l ∈ [0, D + 1] In the sequel, we establish that in at most n(2n + 3) rounds from a configuration of A4, A5(l) is reached along any execution with l ≥ 0.
A tree construction is composed of phases, a root action is the beginning of a new phase (R2) or the beginning of a new tree construction (R1). A phase has 3 exclusive stages: forwarding, expansion, and backwarding. The stages are characterized by the state of processes in the legal tree (i.e. processes verifying the predicate inLegalTree). During the forwarding, some influential processes do not have the P ower status. During the expansion, any influential processes have the P ower status. In the backwarding, there is no influential process.
Lemma 35 From a configuration c4 of A4, the forwarding stage takes at most n − 1 rounds.
Proof: Let cs be a computation step from c4 to c4 where r does not execute any rule. If in c4 , influential(u) is verified then influential(u) is verified in c4 (see Lemma 4, page 14). If in c4, S.u = P ower is verified then the predicate PowerParent(u) is not verified in c4 . We conclude that in c4 , PowerParent(u) is verified then PowerParent(u) is verified in c4. In c4, there is at most n − 1 processes verifying PowerParent. Assume that in c4 there is 0 < l ≤ n − 1 processes verifying PowerParent. A process u verifying PowerParent(u) as the Idle status so QuietSubTree(u) is verified as no process is faulty in A4. According to the definition of the predicate PowerParent, in c4 there is a process u verifying and PowerParent(u) and S.P.u = W orking. So NewPhase(u) is verified till PowerParent(u) is verified. As in A4, no processes has the status StrongE, and RC4 and RC5 are disabled on influential processes. We conclude that R4 or R5 is enabled at u till PowerParent(u) is verified; so after the first round from c4 there is at most l − 1 processes verifying PowerParent because u does not verify PowerParent. Therefore, after l rounds, all influential processes have the P ower status.
Lemma 36
The backwarding stage takes at most n − 1 rounds.
Proof: Let c be a configuration of A4 where no process is influential. Until a r move, no process is influential (Lemma 4). h c is the maximal height of a W orking process in the legal tree in c (we have h c < n). If h c = 0 then EndPhase(r) is verified; so, it exists 0 ≤ l ≤ D such that c ∈ A5(l).
Assume that h c > 0. Let u be a W orking process in the legal tree. As no process verifies the Predicate Faulty and no process is influent, all children of u has the W orking or Idle status, and they have the same phase value as u. All W orking process in the legal tree at height h c , verify the predicate EndPhase because their children have the Idle status. They will verify the predicate EndPhase until their next action (R6 or R7) so they are enabled. We conclude that at c the configuration reached after a single round from c. We have h c > h c . Therefore, after at most h c ≤ n − 1 rounds, a configuration where EndIntermediatePhase(r) on EndLastPhase(r) is verified is reached. 2
Lemma 37 Whatever is the current configuration of A4 and the execution, the root does an action during the first 2n + 3 rounds.
Proof: Lemma 35 establishes that the forwarding stage takes at most n − 1 rounds. Theorem 4 (page 25) establishes that the expansion stage has a duration of at most 4 rounds. Lemma 36 establishes that the backwarding stage takes at most n − 1 rounds. From any configuration after at most 2n + 2 rounds, a configuration c where EndIntermediatePhase(r) or EndLastPhase(r) is verified is reached. As in a configuration of A4, no processes has the status StrongE, and the predicate Ok(r) is verified (Lemma 33). EndIntermediatePhase(r) or EndLastPhase(r) stays verified until r executes the rule R1 or R2. So r does an action before the end of the 2n + 3 rounds from any configuration of A4. 2
Definition 15 Let #r color(c) be the number of processes having the r color in the configuration c.
Lemma 38 Let cs be a computation step from c1 ∈ A4 to reach c2 where r does not executes R1. We have #r color(c1) ≤ #r color(c2).
Proof: r does not change its color (by hypothesis). Let u be a process that changes its color during cs: it executes the rule R3 to choose a process, v, having the Power status as parent. As c1 ∈ A4, inLegalTree(v) is verified in c1; so C.v = C.r = r color. Hence, C.u = r color in c2. We conclude that #r color(c1) ≤ #r color(c2). 2
Lemma 39 Let e be a execution starting from a configuration of A4. Let cs = (c1, c2) be a computation step of e where r executes R2. Let cs = (c3, c4) the following computation step of e where r executes a rule. #r color(c1) < #r color(c3) or c3 ∈ A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D.
Proof: If along e, from c1 to c3, some processes execute R3 then #r color(c1) < #r color(c3). So assume that no process execute R3 from c1 to c3. All processes verifying inLegalTree in c1 execute the rule R7. We conclude that EndLastPhase(r) is verified in c3. 2
Theorem 5 Let c be configuration of A4. along any execution from c a configuration of A5(l) with 0 ≤ l ≤ D + 1 is reached in n(2n + 3) − 1 rounds.
Proof: Let e be an execution starting from a configuration of A4. There are at most n − 1 consecutive computation steps of r in which R2 is executed. At most 2n + 2 rounds are between two actions of r (Lemma 37). 2
Tree constructions from A5(l)
In this subsection, we establish that in at most n(n + 3) rounds from a configuration of A5(l) with l ≤ D, A5(l+1) is reached along any execution. For 0 ≤ k ≤ l, A4(k, l) is the set containing all configurations reached during the kth phase of a tree construction starting from a configuration of A5(l).
Definition 16 Let A4(k,l) with 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ D + 1 be the set of configurations of A4 where every process u verifies the following predicates:
• if dist(u) < l then correct(u)
• if dist(u) ≤ k − 1 then C.u = C.r • if k < dist(u) ≤ l then C.u = C.r • if dist(u) = k − 1 then (∀v ∈ N (u) | C.v = C.r) ∨ (influential(u) ∧ (Child(u) = ∅ ∨ S.u = P ower)) a configuration of A4(1, l) with 0 ≤ l < D + 1, a configuration of A4(1, D + 1) is reached in at most (D + 1)n(2n + 3) rounds. Hence, from a configuration of A4, a configuration of Al is reached along any execution in at most (D + 2)n(2n + 3) rounds. 2
Corollary 9 Al is reached from any configuration after at most 2Dn 2 +4n 2 +O(Dn) rounds.
Any execution from a configuration of Al is a regular execution.
Theorem 7 In Al a complete BFS tree construction is done in D 2 + 3D + 1 rounds. A process executes at most 2D + 1 moves during a complete BFS tree construction.
Proof:
We have A5(D + 1) ⊂ Al. From a configuration of A5(D + 1), a tree construction is done in D + 1 phase. The first phase is done in 2 rounds : r executes the rule R1, then r neighbors (if they exists) execute the rule R3. At the end of the first phase, all processes at distance 1 of r are Idle leaves of the legal tree. The kth phase takes 2k rounds if 1 < k ≤ D:
• during the first round of the phase, r execute R2,
• during the round 2 ≤ i < k, inLegalTree processes at distance i − 1 of r executes the rule R4,
• during the round k, processes at distance k − 1 of r executes R5,
• during the round k + 1, processes at distance k of r execute R3,
• during the round k + 2 ≤ i + k + 1 ≤ 2k, inLegalTree processes at distance k − i of r executes the rule R7 or R6.
At the end of the phase k ≤ D, all processes at distance k of r are the Idle leaves of the legal tree. The D + 1th phase takes 2D + 1 rounds :
• during the first round of the phase, r execute R2, 
